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GAUTREAUX v. PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY: EQUAL
PROTECTION AND PUBLIC HOUSING
The recent decision of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority'
took a step that went both too far and not far enough in the developing
area of judicial intervention in the administration of public housing
programs. In that case, plaintiffs, Negro tenants in and applicants for
public housing in Chicago, brought suit against the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) claiming that defendants had deprived them of
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The first count
of the complaint alleged that defendants had intentionally selected sites
and assigned tenants to public housing units in a manner that main-
tained "existing patterns of urban residential segregation by race" in
Chicago, thus violating plaintiffs' right to the equal protection of the
laws. Count three was identical to the first count except that it omitted
any allegation of intent on the part of the CHA.' Both counts sought
declaratory and injunctive relief. The second and fourth counts re-
peated the allegations of counts one and three, and prayed for relief
pursuant to section 601, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3
CHA moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The court rejected CHA's contention that all
four counts should be dismissed on the grounds that plaintiffs lacked
standing and that the class action was improper; ' however, it did ac-
cept defendant's contention that counts three and four should be rejected
because of plaintiffs' failure to allege intent.5
After presenting evidence on the remaining two counts, both parties
moved for a summary judgment.' Plaintiffs' motion was granted on
the first count of the complaint.7 The plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment on the second count, which sought an injunction against the
use of federal funds by CHA,8 was denied. Although it had already
held that the count did state a cause of action, the court foresaw that
relief of this nature would impede the construction of any public housing,
thus putting the plaintiffs in a worse position than if they had lost the
suit altogether.9
The court postponed relief to allow the parties an opportunity to
formulate a plan which would prohibit the future exclusive location of
public housing in predominantly nonwhite areas. Approximately five
3'296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. IlM. 1969).
2 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. III. 1967).
3 42 U.S.C. §2000d (1964).
4265 F. Supp. at 583.
5Id. at 584.
6 296 F. Supp. at 909.
7Id. at 914.
sId. at 914-15.
9 Id. at 915.
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months later, the court entered an order on the summary judgment.",
The order divided Cook County into two areas. The first area was
labelled the Limited Public Housing Area and was defined by the court
as "that part of [Cook County] which lies either within census tracts
. . . having 30% or more non-white population, or within a distance
of one mile from any point on the outer perimeter of any such census
tract." " The second area was labelled the General Public Housing
Area and was defined by the court as the rest of Cook County.' The
order prohibited CHA from constructing any dwelling units 's within
the Limited Public Housing Area until it has commenced construction
of seven hundred dwelling units in the General Public Housing Area. 4
Moreover, once this condition is satisfied, the court has required that
for every unit CHA constructs in the Limited Public Housing Area, it
must build three units in the General Public Housing Area."5 The
same three-to-one ratio was applied to those units which the CHA
leases, rather than builds.'"
In order to insure against a large concentration of public housing
in any one location, the judgment order directs that each public housing
structure be planned for occupancy by not more than 120 persons.
Where observing this requirement limits CHA's capacity to supply
dwellings, or "if it will assist in achieving the purposes of this judgment
order," the maximum may be raised to 240 persons.17  Furthermore,
the number of CHA low income, nonelderly units is restricted to fifteen
per cent of all dwelling units within a given census tract.' Finally, the
order requires that CHA not provide housing above the third story to
any family with children.' 9
In addition to these specific requirements, the judgment order pro-
vides generally that:
CHA shall use its best efforts to increase the supply of Dwell-
ing Units as rapidly as possible in conformity with the pro-
visions of this judgment order and shall take all steps neces-
sary to that end, including making applications for allocations
I' Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, Civil No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill.,
July 1, 1969).
"Id. at 2.
12 Id.
13 "Dwelling Unit" is defined as an apartment or single family residence occupied
by a low-income, nonelderly family and furnished by or through CHA. Id. at 2.
141d. at 4.
15 Id. The order as formulated requires 75% of new construction subsequent to
the construction of the first 700 units to be in the General Public Housing Area. For
purposes of clarity, this will be referred to as the three-to-one ratio requirement.
16Id. at 4-5. The order refers to these units as "Leased Dwelling Units." A
Leased Dwelling Unit is defined as "a Dwelling Unit in a structure leased or partially
leased by CHA from any person, firm or corporation." Id. at 2. These will normally
be preexisting units which CHA has obtained.
17Id. at 5-6.
18Id. at 6.
11 Id. There is, however, a minor exception not relevant here.
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of federal funds and carrying out all necessary planning and
development ... 20
The court also prescribed new tenant assignment procedures in order
to curb prior discriminatory practices. 1
This Comment demonstrates that the Gautreaux cases combine
an overly restrictive approach to the equal protection clause with an
overly ambitious judgment order. By requiring plaintiffs to prove that
the CHA intentionally selected the great percentage of their sites
within the areas heavily populated by nonwhites, the court ignored re-
cent developments which have tended to favor a less restrictive view of
equal protection in similar circumstances. On the other hand, the
relief was far too broad; although plaintiffs' grievances were remedied,
it is submitted that parts of the relief exceeded that which was necessary
to alleviate the injustice plaintiffs were seeking to correct.
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining whether governmental action violates equal pro-
tection, courts have traditionally used two basic standards of review.22
Under the most commonly applied standard, courts have held that
state action is presumptively valid unless it can be demonstrated that
there was an intent to discriminate,23 or that the action bears no rational
relationship to the accomplishment of a permissible public purpose.
This test has primarily been used when the governmental classification
is essentially "economic." 2
In cases where the state action is particularly suspect because a
group has been singled out on the basis of race or some other "suspect
trait," ' or where a fundamental right is involved,2" an "overriding
justification" standard has been used. One commentator has aptly
defined the characteristics of "suspect traits" and the standard of the
"overriding justification" test:
Some types of classification must be supported by very strong
justification. Racial classifications have been regarded with
2 0 Id. at 9.
211d. exhibit B.
2 See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALrn. L. REv.
341, 353-61 (1949) ; Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind
School Board, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1968) ; Comment, Relocation, Accidental
Inequalities, and the Equal Protection Doctrine, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 579, 583-86
(1969).
2
3 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
2 4 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141 (1940); Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-
Blind School Board, mtpra note 22, at 1512.
25E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (wealth
considered "suspect") ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (race) ;
Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16
STAN. L. REv. 394, 398-99 (1964).
26See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964) (right to vote).
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suspicion by the courts, and unless the government presents
compelling reasons-for example, a wartime emergency-for
the imposition of inequalities on the basis of race, such classi-
fications will be invalidated. The government has also been
required to present strong justification for discriminatory
classifications based on other "suspect traits" such as alienage,
nationality, or economic status. In such cases the courts
appear to have applied a balancing test and to have struck
down classifications which failed to produce societal benefits
outweighing the detriments imposed on the affected class."
The plaintiffs in Gautreaux were not adversely affected by the
court's holding that they must prove discriminatory intent, since they
were fortunate enough to be able to do so. But since discriminatory
intent is hard to prove in most cases, the rule places a severe limitation
on availability of the equal protection clause in fields such as public
housing. The "suspect traits" doctrine generally provides no help,
because there is no explicit classification by race. Furthermore, it is
hard to argue that this type of case involves a "fundamental right."
All that can readily be demonstrated is that the operation of this
government program in the context of preexisting social conditions
produces a result which is unequal in fact, leaving identifiable dis-
advantaged groups worse off than the rest of society. The problem
in bringing such a situation within the scope of the equal protection
clause is that the state action which produces this type of inequality is
often incontestably "rational," as that word is used in traditional equal
protection doctrine. The programs are usually good faith, reasonable
attempts to cure social problems. Furthermore, the inequality they
produce is not "intended" in any sense except that it is foreseeable and
that special efforts can be made to alleviate it. The Gautreaux court's
holding that "intent" must be proved leaves this type of inequality
in government programs constitutionally unassailable.
This holding is at odds with other recent decisions which have
recognized the constitutional rights of disadvantaged minorities inade-
quately provided for by seemingly impartial government programs.
In Hobson v. Hansen,"8 the District Court for the District of Columbia
examined the District school board's "neighborhood school" policy and
the practice of administering ability-grouping tests within the school
system. The court, in an extraordinarily lengthy opinion, held that
even though there were no suspicious traits inherent in the policies, and
even though there was positive justification for such policies, their
effect was severely detrimental to a disadvantaged minority.
27 Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Superzision of the Color-Blind School Board,
supra note 22, at 1511-12.
28269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (opinion by Skelley Wright, J.), aff'd sub nor.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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[G]overnmental action which without justification 29 imposes
unequal burdens or awards unequal benefits is unconstitu-
tional. The complaint that analytically no violation of equal
protection vests unless the inequalities stem from a delib-
erately discriminatory plan is simply false.30
The court held that the "neighborhood school" policy was responsible
for the de facto school segregation which was prevalent in the district,a'
and that the ability-grouping test was relegating Negro students to blue
collar employment at the very early stages of grammar school. 2 The
court ordered measures that would diminish de facto segregation,
3 and
compensatory programs that would counteract the harmful effects of
segregation in cases where it was not possible to eliminate it entirely.34
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,35 the
Second Circuit applied the rationale of the Hobson court to the housing
area. Plaintiffs in that case argued, inter alia, that the Norwalk Re-
development Agency's administration of the relocation program was
effectively driving nonwhites from the city of Norwalk.3  Again, there
was no "suspect trait" inherent in the statute or in its administration
and there was difficulty in proving that the agency was intending the
adverse effects which nonwhite displacees were experiencing. In fact,
the lower court had sustained the contention that any detrimental
effects were not the result of being compelled to leave condemned sites,
but due rather to the fact that there was an extremely tight and highly
discriminatory housing market, which was in no way the fault of the
authority.3' The Second Circuit held, however, that even though this
detrimental effect was "accidental," rather than intentional, the planners
2 The opinion later makes clear that where "adventitious" inequality harms dis-
advantaged minorities, the test of validating justification is a heavy one, and not the
"rational basis" test used in judging other types of classifications. Id. at 506-07.
3 0 Id. at 497.
31 In 11 of 17 schools in predominantly white areas, 85 to 100% of the respective
student bodies were white. In the rest of the district, 139 of 156 schools were at least
85% Negro. The district school system was 902% black. Id. at 410-12.
32 The ability grouping tests were nationally standardized examinations designed
to distinguish students of differing aptitudes. Grouping students on the basis of their
performance on these tests was supposed to avoid the problem of a unitary curriculum
which bores bright children and discourages the less bright. Experts testified that
the tests used language unfamiliar to lower class black children. Thus black children
were more likely to do poorly, and as a result be relegated to an inferior educational
program geared to preparing them for only menial jobs. Id. at 511-15.
33 Measures suggested by the court included educational parks, school pairing, and
possible cooperative programs with neighboring suburban school districts. Pending
implementation of such measures, the school district was required to bus black children
into white schools. Id. at 515.
34 The court stated that those children for whom it was, for practical reasons,
impossible to provide integrated education, should at least be given equal opportunity.
The detriment inherent in their education should be eliminated by affording those
children special attention. Id.
35 395 F2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) ; see Comment, Relocation, Accidental Inequalities,
and the Equal Protection Doctrine, supra note 22.
36 395 F2d at 924.
3
7 See id. at 930.
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should have foreseen such harsh effects."8 Therefore, they had an
affirmative duty to insure that adequate housing was available to
nonwhite displacees3 9
The holdings of the two cases are not identical. Hobson's formu-
lation is that a very heavy burden of justification must be sustained in
order to validate unequal educational opportunities for disadvantaged
minorities.4° Norwalk CORE's statement is that the state must take
special measures to avoid inequality which will foreseeably result from
the operation of its programs in the context of given social conditions.
But the difference is more apparent than real. To say that the state
must go to great lengths in finding alternatives to producing inequality
is essentially the same as saying that it must bear a heavy burden of
justifying the inequality. The crucial point is that both opinions shifted
attention from the motives of the state agent to the results produced, at
least where important needs of disadvantaged minorities are concerned.
In both cases, the governmental action did not, on its face, present any
suspect traits. However, groups whose explicit classification the courts
have normally considered "suspect" were being adversely affected in
important respects, such as education and housing, by the administration
of programs which did not directly or explicitly so classify them. The
injury to the disadvantaged minorities was recognized to be so severe
that the result was as harmful as if it had been intended.
The fact pattern within the Gautreaux case fits within the reach of
this expansive equal protection doctrine developed in Hobson and
Norwalk. Plaintiffs alleged that the administration of the Illinois
public housing statute was "maintaining existing patterns of urban
residential segregation by race . . . . " " The problem had become
so severe that "99 % of CHA family units are located in areas which
are or soon will be substantially all Negro." 42 This type of adverse
effect upon a disadvantaged group is a violation of equal protection as
developed in Hobson and Norwalk, whether or not it was the purpose
of CHA to achieve it.
By rejecting this expansive doctrine of equal protection, the
Gautreaux court places a tremendous burden on future plaintiffs with
similar grievances. The plaintiffs were able to overcome it in Gautreaux,
38 It is unclear whether Norwalk CORE should be read as totally dispensing with
the need to allege "intent" to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiffs did make such an allegation. Id. at 925. And the Second Circuit held
that on the facts alleged, the allegation of intent would be sustained. Id. at 930-31.
In the light of other language in the opinion, it seems that what the court meant was
that intent was fairly alleged if it was shown that the agency implemented its plan
with knowledge of the circumstances, such as discrimination in the private housing
market, in the context of which the plan produced unequal results. Id. at 924, 931.
The court clearly rejected any requirement of proof of a desire or purpose to produce
adversely unequal results.
39 Id. at 931-32.
40 See Note, Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School Board, supra note 22,
at 1512-13.
41265 F. Supp. at 583.
42 296 F. Supp. at 910.
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but the circumstances of the case were exceptional and unlikely to be
repeated.
The Illinois statute requires that the Chicago City Council approve
sites selected by CHA.4 3 Recognizing City Council's ultimate power
over the site selection process, CHA developed the practice of informally
submitting sites for family housing to the City Council Alderman in
whose ward the site was located. Sites in white areas were almost
invariably vetoed by the respective aldermen and therefore not sub-
mitted for City Council approval, because the waiting lists for public
housing were ninety per cent Negro.44 Apparently motivated by their
desire not to engage in practices which would promote segregation,
CHA members readily admitted to the court that deliberate segregation
by race was an inherent and undisguised component of their system
of selecting public housing sites.
Factual situations in which the public housing authority expresses
"commendable frankness" " are likely to be the exception rather than
the rule. Furthermore, few situations are likely to present indicia of
purposeful discrimination as clear as those in the Gautreaux case. If
Gautreaux's holding on the intent requirement is followed, it will impose
on future plaintiffs the burden, which in practice will usually be very
difficult to sustain, of showing that the facts supported the inference
that the housing agency intended to maintain segregation.
II. THERELIEF
Although rejecting a progressive stance on the equal protection
doctrine, the court acted boldly in tailoring relief. It went beyond
insuring that public housing would not be located exclusively in the
ghetto areas of Chicago; it also attempted to insure that public housing
would never be concentrated in one location. The latter portion of the
relief, while sociologically and aesthetically beneficial, went beyond what
was needed to satisfy plaintiffs' equal protection claim.
A. A Quota System to End Segregation: The Three-to-One
Ratio Requirement
The requirement that the location of housing units conform to a
quota system based on the racial mixture of neighborhoods is un-
precedented. Strong support for this measure, however, comes, by way
of analogy, from other areas where there has been a violation of equal
protection, specifically school desegregation cases.
43 Il. Axx. STAT., ch. 672, § 9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
44296 F. Supp. at 912-13.
45M. at 912.
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It has been suggested that Brown v. Board of Education,46 which
holds that state-created racial segregation in public schools is uncon-
stitutional, requires the elimination of even benign classifications that
attempt to compensate for past injuries.47 However, courts have upheld
state legislation and school board policies which have incorporated racial
classifications in order to eliminate racial imbalance.4"
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held in Green v.
County School Board 49 that a state must take affirmative steps to elim-
inate the effects of de jure school segregation. Holding invalid "free-
dom of choice" plans which sought to satisfy the equal protection re-
quirement, the Court declared that school boards were charged with an
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert
to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch." '0 The Hobson court had already gone farther than
Green by requiring a school district to take affirmative steps to eliminate
that segregation which had not been deliberate but was merely de facto."'
Norwalk extended the logic of Hobson to housing by suggesting
that the Norwalk Redevelopment Agency would have to take affirma-
tive steps to insure that nonwhite displacees would be satisfactorily re-
located.52 The Gautreauz court thus had ample precedent to impose an
affirmative duty upon CHA to remedy the effects of its past policies.
There is one further problem with the affirmative action called for
by the court order. The steps required by the court were quite specific.
There is some evidence in the desegregation cases 53 that courts ordering
specific actions on the part of a school board must allow for some flexi-
bility to compensate for administrative difficulties. In United States
v. Montgomery County Board of Education,4 the Supreme Court
upheld a district court order requiring schools to have at least one non-
white teacher for every five whites. On the basis of the district court's
46347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47See Goldman, Benign Racial Classifications: A Constitutional Dilemma, 35
U. CIN. L. REv. 349 (1966). Compare Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools:
The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. Rv. 564, 588-98 (1965), with Kaplan,
Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58
Nw. U. L. R1v. 157, 171-73 (1963).
48See, e.g., Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968)
(The Constitution permits state action aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating
de facto school segregation).
49 391 U.S. 430 (1968). On the same day, the Court applied the same holding
in two other cases. See Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968) ; Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). See generally Wright, Public School
Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 285,
298-306 (1965).
50 391 U.S. at 437-38.
51 See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
52 395 F2d at 931-32.
53 See, e.g., Pard of Educ. v. Dowell, 375 F2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 931 (1967); Kier v. School Bd., 249 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Va. 1966).
54 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
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actions in developing the order, the Court inferred that the ratio would
be applied flexibly:
[T]he Court of Appeals made many arguments against rigid
or inflexible orders in this kind of case. These arguments
might possibly be more troublesome if we read the District
Court's order as being absolutely rigid and inflexible, as did
the Court of Appeals. But after a careful consideration of the
whole record we cannot believe that Judge Johnson had any
such intention. . . . On at least one occasion Judge Johnson,
on his own motion, amended his outstanding order because
a less stringent order for another district had been approved by
the Court of Appeals. This was done in order not to inflict
any possible injustice on the Montgomery school system. 5
Implicit in this opinion is the idea that an order not presenting evidence
of a court's intention of flexible application would present great
difficulties.
The Gautreaux order contains enough built-in flexibility to remove
any doubt about the court's intention:
This Court retains jurisdiction of this matter for all pur-
poses, including enforcement and the issuance, upon proper
notice and motion, of orders modifying or supplementing the
terms of this order upon the presentation of relevant informa-
tion with respect to proposed developments designed by CHA
alone or in combination with other private or public agencies
to achieve results consistent with this order, material changes
in conditions existing at the time of this order, or any other
matter.568
For example, if CHA should demonstrate at a later time that imple-
mentation of the three-to-one ratio impedes the entire public housing
program because of the high costs of land in suburban areas, or because
public housing in these white areas proves to be undesirable to Negro
applicants, the court could modify the order.
B. Beyond the Quota: Spreading Public Housing
Throughout the Community
In addition to the quota requirement, the Gautreaux court ordered
that no public housing be built which is designed to house more than
120 people, that no public housing be built in an area where more than
fifteen per cent of the dwelling units are public housing, and that no
55Id. at 234-35.
56 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., Civil No. 66 C 1459, at 10 (N.D. Ill.,
July 1, 1969).
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public housing be provided above the third story for families with
children.
57
While the first two requirements also insure that public housing
will not be located exclusively in the ghetto areas of Chicago, they are
superfluous. The three-to-one ratio requirement is a direct, effective,
and adequate means to the achievement of that goal. The other require-
ments must rest on the existence of some independent justification.
One possible justification is that they prevent the creation of a new
black public housing ghetto. Certainly the impact of the Gautreaux
decision would be weakened substantially if housing authorities comply
with the order by concentrating all their public construction in a par-
ticular white area, thereby merely extending the existing black ghetto.
Prohibiting vertical development means that more land than was
previously required is needed to build the same number of units. Since
the acquisition of a large tract of land in an urban area is more difficult
than acquisition of a small tract, the likelihood of concentrated public
housing is small. Thus, prohibiting a concentration of public housing
tends to prevent the creation of concentrated black public housing in
any area of Chicago.5"
The assumption on which such an argument is based is that a
very large percentage of the public housing in white areas will be in-
habited by blacks. The ninety per cent black waiting lists for public
housing provide support for such an assumption. Nevertheless, there
is convincing evidence that a greater percentage of whites will seek
public housing if most of the units are built in white areas. First, in
Chicago there are twice as many whites eligible for low cost non-elderly
public housing as nonwhites.59 The small number of whites currently
in public housing is a result of the undesirable location of most of the
present public housing units (the primarily nonwhite areas)." There-
fore, the reluctance of whites to enter public housing would be sub-
stantially reduced if such housing became available in more desirable
locations. Second, since the housing market is becoming increasingly
tight, whites who are eligible for public housing in the future will no
longer have the option of finding low rent private housing, and will
seek desirable public housing units.
Even if the court was right in assuming that in order fully to
guarantee the equal protection of the laws to Negroes in the public
housing program it was necessary to take special measures to avoid
57 The order requires that CHA continue to use its best efforts to increase the
supply of public housing. See text accompanying note 20 supra. There is a question
whether the court has the power to order such affirmative action. The court should
be able to issue such an order for the purpose of correcting the effects of past dis-
criminatory policies. However, once these effects have been corrected, the court may
only regulate how CHA builds, not whether it builds at all. The community has no
legal obligation to provide public housing.
58 An undesirable effect of this requirement is that it increases the cost of public
housing programs by requiring the purchase of more land.
59 296 F. Supp. at 915.
60 Id.
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geographical concentration of public housing built in the future, parts
of the relief granted cannot be justified on this ground. Each indi-
vidual requirement is, of course, likely to have a variety of different
effects. Conceivably each requirement imposed on CHA by the court
could contribute to preventing the geographical concentration of new
public housing. But the requirement that the number of low income
non-elderly public housing units be limited to fifteen per cent of the
total number of dwelling units within a given census tract should be
sufficient to achieve this result without the need for further require-
ments. In the light of this fact, it seems probable that the other two
requirements, the 120 person per project limitation and the prohibition
on providing dwelling units above the third story to families with chil-
dren, were incorporated in the order for sociological and aesthetic,
rather than equal protection, reasons. They were therefore inconsistent
with the legal theory on which the case was decided.
CONCLUSION
The court in Gautreaux had its heart in the right place. However,
in dismissing the counts of the complaint which did not allege intent
it applied an overly restrictive interpretation of the equal protection
doctrine. Although this restrictive application did not affect the
plaintiffs in Gautreaux, it will be an unfavorable precedent for plaintiffs
with similar grievances in future law suits. Furthermore, the gen-
erosity of the court in fashioning relief led it to take an excessively
large step in the judicial administration of public housing programs.
It based the granting of relief to cure inequality on a dubious factual
assumption, and it granted further relief not essentially related to the
inequality problem, but based on general sociological and aesthetic
considerations.
